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I. INTRODUCTION
[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direc-
tion to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obliga-
tions does he owe as a fiduciary?I
The Minnesota Legislature enacted The Minnesota Limited Liabil-
ity Company Act in 1992. As of January 1, 1993, Minnesota busi-
1. Securities & Exch. Comm. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S, 80, 85-86 (1943).
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nesses can elect to form a limited liability company (LLC).2 The
LLC is a hybrid entity that combines the limited liability of a corpora-
tion,3 and the tax benefits of a partnership.4
Because the LLC is a relatively new entity in the United States,
5
issues remain concerning judicial interpretation. One such issue is
the fiduciary duty of LLC members. While many LLC statutes have
addressed this duty, these statutes have failed to provide a uniform
standard for a judicial response to breaches of fiduciary duty.6 This
lack of uniformity will inevitably lead to confusion and judicial
misinterpretation.
First, this Comment discusses the concept of fiduciary duty in the
context of closely held corporations and partnerships, 7 the two enti-
ties most likely to be supplanted by the LLC. Following a discussion
of the development of the LLC,8 this Comment analyzes the existing
LLC statutes' treatment of fiduciary duty9 and compares the Minne-
sota LLC Act's treatment of fiduciary duty to that of the other LLC
2. See MINN. STAT. §§ 332B.01-.60 (1992).
3. In a corporation, investors are not liable for corporate obligations. Rather,
their liability is limited to the amount of capital invested in the corporation. Phillip I.
Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 1IJ. CORP. L. 573, 574-75 (1986); see
generally JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, AMERICAN LAw: THE FORMATIVE YEARS:
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE (1972); Larry E. Rib-
stein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80 (1991).
4. A partnership is taxed only at the individual level and does not pay income
tax as an entity. See I.R.C. § 701 (1992); cf I.R.C. §§ 11, 61 (1992). On the other
hand, a corporation suffers the potential for double taxation. A corporation pays
taxes on the entity's income, and out of that income may pay dividends to the share-
holders who pay individual income taxes on that dividend income. See I.R.C. §§ 11,
61 (1992). Although a partnership provides a more favorable tax scheme, there is no
limited liability. Rather, all partners are jointly or jointly and severally liable for the
obligations of the partnership. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15 (1914); see also Ellen
Hanson, Liability Fears Inspire Twists on Partnership, BOSTON Bus. J., Jan. 4, 1993, at 16
(discussing Massachusetts limited liability partnership legislation as a response to the
liability of partners in a partnership).
5. Wyoming adopted the first LLC enabling statute in 1977. However, the ori-
gins of the entity date back to the late 1800s when several states allowed for the
creation of partnership associations. Partnership associations provided the owners
with a shield against liability for the obligations of the association. The entity never
gained popularity because of federal tax concerns. Scott R. Anderson, The Illinois
Limited Liability Company: A Flexible Alternative for Business, 25 Loy U. CHI. L.J. 55, 59
(1993).
6. Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging
Entity, 47 Bus. LAw. 378, 401 (1992). A motivating factor for the adoption of the
Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 was the perceived need for uniformity of the law.
The inconsistency of legal theories and application of the law was seen as an impedi-
ment to the use of partnerships by firms with business and members in different
states. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT historical notes at 7 (1914).
7. See infra part II.
8. See infra part III.A.
9. See infra part III.B.
[Vol. 19
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statutes.' 0 Finally, this Comment proposes a foundation for devel-
oping a standard of fiduciary duty that can be uniformly incorpo-
rated in future legislation.i"
II. FIDUCIARY DUTY
A. Background
Fiduciary duty is defined as "[a] duty to act for someone else's
benefit, while subordinating one's personal interests to that of the
other person."1 2 This "obligation of utmost good faith"'8 includes
three distinct elements:
(1) a duty of loyalty;
(2) a duty of good faith and fair dealing; and
(3) a duty of full disclosure.14
10. See infra part IV.
11. See infra part V.
12. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990). In Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S.
295, 311 (1939), the United States Supreme Court stated:
He who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve himself first and his ces-
tuis second. He cannot manipulate the affairs of his corporation to their
detriment and in disregard of the standards of common decency and hon-
esty. He cannot by the intervention of a corporate entity violate the ancient
precept against serving two masters. He cannot by the use of the corporate
device avail himself of privileges normally permitted outsiders in a race of
creditors. He cannot utilize his inside information and his strategic position
for his own preferment. He cannot violate rules of fair play by doing indi-
rectly through the corporation what he could not do directly. He cannot use
his power for his personal advantage and to the detriment of the stockhold-
ers and creditors no matter how absolute in terms that power may be and no
matter how meticulous he is to satisfy technical requirements. For that
power is at all times subject to the equitable limitation that it may not be
exercised for the aggrandizement, preference, or advantage of the fiduciary
to the exclusion or detriment of the cestuis. Where there is a violation of
those principles, equity will undo the wrong or intervene to prevent its
consummation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
13. Knapp v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 154 F.2d 395, 398 (10th Cir. 1946)
(citations omitted); Rhue v. Dawson, 841 P.2d 215, 221 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Baker
v. Baker, 67 Cal. Rptr. 523, 524 (Ct. App. 1968); Hamilton v. Williams, 573 N.E.2d
1276, 1288 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Notch View Assocs. v. Smith, 615 A.2d 676, 680 (NJ.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992); Pace v. Perk, 440 N.Y.S.2d 710, 716 (App. Div. 1981).
14. Robert C. Montgomery, The Fiduciary Duties of General Partners, 17 COLO. LAw.
1959, 1960 (1992). See generally Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, 9 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 285 (1989) (presenting a historical analysis of the fiduciary obliga-
tion); Walter R. Hinnant, Comment, Fiduciary Duties of Directors: How Far Do They Go?,
23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 163 (1988) (analyzing the fiduciary duties of corporate di-
rectors). This Comment does not address a member's duty of care in an LLC. Com-
mentators debate whether or not the duty of care is a fiduciary duty. See generally
Carey Kirk, Duty of Care and Duty of Loyalty in the Aftermath of Trans Union, 5 COOLEY L.
REV. 1 (1988) (discussing the various views of fiduciary duty). Regardless of whether
or not the duty of care is a fiduciary duty, many LLC statutes addressing the fiduciary
duty issue separate the duty of loyalty and the duty of care by distinguishing the
19931
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1. Duty of Loyalty
In a partnership, the duty of loyalty requires "fidelity that excludes
not only patent self-dealing but insists on the avoidance of situations
where the fiduciary's own interests bring into question the interests
of those to whom he owes a duty of undiluted loyalty."1 5 In a closely
held corporation, a shareholder's duty is similar to that of a partner
in a partnership.16
2. Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
In a partnership, the duty of good faith and fair dealing requires a
partner to conduct business with honesty and to be held accountable
for any transaction between the partnership and the partner.] 7 In a
closely held corporation, this duty prevents a majority shareholder
from seizing a corporate opportunity for personal gain after having
recommended that the corporation forego the opportunity.IS
3. Duty of Full Disclosure
In a partnership, a partner must disclose all information that has a
material impact on the business,19 without misrepresenting the in-
extent to which the LLC may indemnify members for breaches of duty. See, e.g., IOWA
CODE ANN. § 490A.707 (West Supp. 1994). For an in-depth analysis of the LLC stat-
utes' treatment of the duty of care, see Carter G. Bishop & Daniel S. Kleinberger,
TAX & BusINESS PLANNING OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (Warren, Gorham & La-
mont, forthcoming 1994).
15. Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989). In referring to this
duty, Justice Cardozo stated: "[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior." Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,
546 (N.Y. 1928).
16. See Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316, 322 (Il1. App. Ct. 1990); Estep v.
Werner, 780 S.W.2d 604, 609 (Ky. 1989); Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798, 801
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Rosiny v. Schmidt, 587 N.Y.S.2d 929, 937 (App. Div. 1992);
Noakes v. Schoenborn, 841 P.2d 682, 687 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
17. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 21(1) (1914). This subsection provides:
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as
trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other
partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or
liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property.
Id. See also MINN. STAT. § 323.20 (1992) (codifying this U.P.A. provision).
18. See Steelman v. Mallory, 716 P.2d 1282, 1285-86 (Idaho 1986); PJ Acquisition
Corp. v. Skoglund, 453 N.W.2d 1, 22 (Minn. 1990); Weiner Inv. Co. v. Weiner, 804
P.2d 1211, 1212 (Or. Ct. App. 1991); Giannotti v. Hamway, 387 S.E.2d 725, 731 (Va.
1990); J Bar H, Inc. v. Johnson, 822 P.2d 849, 860 (Wyo. 1991); see also Daniel
Walker, Legal Handles Used to Open or Close the Corporate Opportunity Door, 56 Nw. U. L.
REV. 608 (1961) (discussing the concept of corporate opportunity).
19. See Reed v. Robilio, 400 F.2d 730, 733 (6th Cir. 1968) (citing Malden Trust
Co. v. Brooks, 197 N.E. 100, 106 (Mass. 1935)); Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown &
Baerwitz, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901, 904 (Ct. App. 1976); Konsuvo v. Netzke, 220 A.2d 424,
432 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1966); Miller v. Miller, 700 S.W.2d 941, 946 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1985); Tennant v. Dunlop, 33 S.E. 620, 623 (Va. 1889).
[Vol. 19
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formation to the partnership.20 Likewise, in a closely held corpora-
tion, a shareholder is required to disclose any known material
information that is relevant to the transaction at hand.21 Any false
representation or concealment of such information constitutes a
breach of fiduciary duty.22
The protection afforded by a fiduciary duty is extremely important
and cannot be overemphasized. A majority shareholder in a closely
held corporation or a partner in a partnership has the ability and
opportunity, by means of management control, to "freeze-out"2"
other members of the business.24 Courts generally seek to remedy
such actions.25
20. See Courtney v. Waring, 237 Cal. Rptr. 233, 239 (Ct. App. 1987); Malkus v.
Gaines, 434 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Noss v. Abrams, 787 S.W.2d
834, 838 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
21. See, e.g., Puritan Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Cashman, 596 N.E.2d 1004, 1010 (Mass.
1992).
22. Id.
23. "Freeze-out" is defined as:
[A] process, usually in a closely held corporation, by which minority
shareholders are prevented from receiving any direct or indirect financial
return from the corporation in an effort to persuade them to liquidate their
investment in the corporation on terms favorable to the controlling share-
holders. The use of corporate control vested in the statutory majority of
shareholders or the board of directors to eliminate minority shareholders
from the enterprise or to reduce to relevant insignificance their voting
power or claims on corporate assets. It implies a purpose to force upon the
minority shareholder a change which is not incident to any other business
goal of the corporation.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 666 (6th ed. 1990).
24. See L. Clark Hicks, Jr., Recent Decision, Corporations-Fiduciary Duty-In a
Close Corporation, a Majority Shareholder Owes a Fiduciary Duty Towards the Minority When
Seeking a Controlling Share, 60 Miss. L.J. 425, 426-35 (1990); Daniel S. Kleinberger,
Why Not Good Faith? The Foibles of Fairness in the Law of Close Corporations, 16 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1143, 1151-53 (1990) (discussing the potential for widespread
abuse of minority shareholders in closely held corporations). See also F. HODGE
O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
(2d ed. 1991) (seminal treatise on the manner in which oppression occurs in closely
held corporations); Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1630,
1630-34 (1961) (discussing techniques for manipulating minority shareholders).
25. See Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3, 14 (1st Cir. 1986) (recognizing that
freeze-out actions are viewed as a tort); Christman v. Seymour, 700 P.2d 898, 900
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that duty to not freeze-out is the same for trustees as
for partners or shareholders of close corporation); Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 44
(Cal. 1961) (holding that freeze-out in partnership is not permitted); Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1978) (discussing the need to
protect minority shareholders in both closely held corporations and partnerships);
Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 167, 169 (Miss. 1989) (stating that freeze-out is a breach
of fiduciary duty); Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 538 N.Y.S.2d 771, 778 (N.Y.
1989) (recognizing that a minority shareholder requires special judicial protection);
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B. Judicial Treatment of Fiduciary Duty
Although the principle of fiduciary duty is generally uniformly ac-
cepted,2 6 courts have examined a number of key issues in interpret-
ing the duty. These issues include: (1) whether the jurisdiction
applies a strict fiduciary duty rule or the lenient business judgment
rule; (2) whether the plaintiff or the defendant has the burden of
proof; (3) whether the rule applied is based on tort theory or con-
tract theory; and (4) whether the breach of fiduciary duty warrants an
assessment of punitive damages.
1. The Strict Fiduciary Duty Rule Versus the Business Judgment Rule
The strict fiduciary duty rule requires a majority shareholder in a
closely held corporation to maintain a standard of conduct matching
that required of a partner in a partnership.2 7 Thus a shareholder,
holding either a majority or minority share, must conduct affairs of
the corporation with the utmost good faith and loyalty. 28 In Donahue
v. Rodd Electrotype Co. ,29 the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that
this rule must be applied to disputes between shareholders of closely
held corporations.30 The court focused on the members' need to
rely on each other with confidence and trust and on the need to deter
freeze-out efforts by the majority shareholder.31
In contrast, the more lenient "business judgment rule" is tradi-
tionally imposed on corporate officials and requires corporate offi-
cials to conduct themselves with good faith and in a manner that an
ordinarily prudent person would conduct oneself given similar cir-
cumstances.3 2 Because application of the strict fiduciary duty rule
26. See De Santis v. Dixon 236 P.2d 38, 41 (Ariz. 1951); Tucker v. Ellbogen, 793
P.2d 592, 597 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992);
Tillis v. United Parts, Inc., 395 So. 2d 618, 619 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Wheeler v.
Waller, 197 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Iowa 1972); Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 582 P.2d
1136, 1146 (Kan. 1978); Thibaut v. Thibaut, 607 So. 2d 587, 603-604 (La. Ct. App.
1992); Edwards v. Gramling Eng'g Corp., 588 A.2d 793, 798 (Md. 1991); Leavitt v.
Leisure Sports, Inc., 734 P.2d 1221, 1224 (Nev. 1987); Renberg v. Zarrow, 667 P.2d
465, 471-72 (Okla. 1983); Thigpen v. Locke 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962); Burke
v. Farrell, 656 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Utah 1982); Giannotti v. Hamway, 387 S.E.2d 725,
731 (Va. 1990); Bailey v. Vaughan, 359 S.E.2d 599, 602 (W. Va. 1987);J Bar H, Inc.
v. Johnson, 822 P.2d 849, 859 (Wyo. 1991).
27. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975).
28. Id. at 515 n.17.
29. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
30. Id. at 515.
31. Id.
32. The business judgment rule has been defined as
[A] presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corpo-
ration acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company. Absent an abuse
of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the courts. The burden is
[Vol. 19
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may hinder corporate activities,33 courts have required a lesser show-
ing of loyalty to the business on the part of the acting shareholder.34
One year after the Donahue decision, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court revisited the issue of fiduciary duty in Wilkes v. Springside Nurs-
ing Home, Inc. ,a5 stating that
[the] untempered application of the strict good faith standard
enunciated in Donahue to cases such as the one before us will result
in the imposition of limitations on legitimate action by the control-
ling group in a close corporation which will unduly hamper its ef-
fectiveness in managing the corporation in the best interest of all
concerned.3 6
Attempting to find some middle ground in applying the fiduciary
principle, the court went on to posit a test that requires the acting
shareholder to show some legitimate business purpose for the action
in question.37 This standard would allow the corporate members the
opportunity to conduct affairs with some discretion and flexibility,
thereby promoting the best interests of the business.38 Despite
Wilkes' advancement of this modified business judgment standard,
courts continue to apply either the strict fiduciary duty rule or the
modified business judgment rule.39
on the party challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the
presumption.
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted). In Minnesota,
the business judgment rule is codified at MINN. STAT. § 302A.251 (1992) (setting
forth the standard of conduct for directors) and MINN. STAT. § 302A.361 (1992) (set-
ting forth the standard of conduct for officers). See also Babatunde M. Animashuan,
The Business Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties and Liabilities of Corporate Directors, 16 S.U. L.
REV. 345 (1989) (discussing the implications of the business judgement rule); Bartley
A. Brennan, Current Developments Surrounding the Business Judgment Rule: A "Race to the
Bottom" Theory of Corporate Law Revived, 12 WHITrIER L. REV. 299 (1991) (examining
current trends in application of the rule).
33. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass.
1976).
34. E.g., Nicholson v. Kingery, 261 P. 122 (Wyo. 1927). In Nicholson, the court
stated: "[I]f upon a careful scrutiny of the record it appears to a court of equity that
the director has been open, fair and honest in his dealing with the corporation, and
has secured no advantage by his contract to the detriment of the corporation it will
be upheld." Id. at 124 (citing Bently v. Zelma Oil Co., 184 P. 131 (Okla. 1919)). See
also Will v. Engebretson & Co., Inc., 261 Cal. Rptr. 868, 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989);
Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 498 A.2d 642, 652 (Md. 1985); Delahoussaye v.
Newhard, 785 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Daniels v. Thomas, Dean &
Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 367 (Mont. 1990); DiIaconi v. New Cal Corp., 643 P.2d
1234, 1240 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); Winter v. Bernstein, 566 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1015
(Sup. Ct. 1991); Klinicki v. Lundgren, 695 P.2d 906, 920 (Or. 1985).
35. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
36. Id. at 663.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. For decisions applying the strict fiduciary duty rule, see Cecconi v. Cecco,
Inc., 739 F. Supp. 41, 45 (D. Mass. 1990); Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548,
1993]
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The distinction between these standards is of utmost importance
in light of the potential for abuse of the minority by the majority in a
closely held corporation.40 This abuse is commonly referred to as
oppression of the minority interests.4l Oppression of a minority
shareholder leading to a breach of fiduciary duty claim often occurs
in the context of a share purchase or sale on the part of the majority
shareholder.42 Such claims also arise when majority shareholders
convert corporate assets and either cause them to be wasted or to be
used for personal gain.43 The minority shareholder has little power
1559 (W.D. Penn. 1984); Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316, 323 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990); Boushery v. Ishak, 550 N.E.2d 784, 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Zimmerman v.
Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849, 853 (Mass. 1988);JRY Corp. v. LeRoux, 464 N.E.2d 82, 90-
91 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984); Pinehurst, Ltd. v. Jarratt, No. 01-A-01-9106-CH-00208,
1991 WL 241184, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 1991).
For decisions applying the business judgment rule, see Weaver v. Millard, 819
P.2d 110, 120 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991); Hallahan v. Haltom Corp., 385 N.E.2d 1033,
1034 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979); Levine v. Levine, 590 N.Y.S.2d 439, 443 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992).
40. See Kleinberger, supra note 24, at 1151 (discussing judicial response to op-
pression of close corporation shareholders). The ability to abuse one's co-owners is
not limited to majority shareholders. In some instances, minority shareholders find
themselves in a position of power that creates the opportunity for oppression. In
these cases, minority shareholders should be held to the same fiduciary duty of loy-
alty and good faith. See, e.g., Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 799-
803 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (finding minority shareholder, as one of four sharehold-
ers, breached duty of loyalty in refusing to vote for dividends and this action, which
resulted in tax penalties, was wrongful use of what was equivalent to veto control of
corporation when corporate articles required 80 percent vote for corporate actions).
41. See Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 393-94 (Or.
1973). In discussing oppressive conduct, the court articulated:
While general definitions of 'oppressive' conduct are of little value for appli-
cation in a specific case, perhaps the most widely quoted definitions are that
'oppressive conduct' for the purpose of such a statute is: "[Blurdensome,
harsh and wrongful conduct; a lack of probity and fair dealing in the affairs
of a company to the prejudice of some of its members; or a visual departure
from the standards of fair dealing, and a violation of fair play on which every
shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely." We
agree, however, that the question of what is 'oppressive' conduct by those in
control of a 'close' corporation as its majority stockholders is closely related
to what we agree to be the fiduciary duty of a good faith and fair dealing
owed by them to its minority stockholders.
Id. at 440 (citations omitted).
42. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 276-77 (Alaska 1980);
Cressy v. Shannon Continental Corp., 378 N.E.2d 941, 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978);
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 518 (Mass. 1978); Horizon
House-Microwave, Inc. v. Bazzy, 486 N.E.2d 70, 72-73 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985); Dela-
houssaye v. Newhard, 785 S.W.2d 609, 611-12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Forinash v.
Daugherty, 697 S.W.2d 294, 304-05 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Estate of Schroer v. Stamco
Supply, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 975, 980-81 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
43. See Holden v. Construction Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 348, 357 (Iowa 1972)
(holding that self-dealing is a breach of duty); Maschmeier v. Southside Press, Ltd.,
435 N.W.2d 377, 381 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (wrongful use of corporate assets is op-
[Vol. 19
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to influence the majority shareholder's conduct and consequently
the courts must protect these interests.44
Minnesota courts have not uniformly applied fiduciary princi-
ples.45 In some recent cases, the courts have adopted the business
judgment rule.46 This rule is codified in Minnesota's Business Cor-
poration Act.47 Having recognized that members of a closely held
corporation can be viewed as partners for application of the rule,48
pression); Dixon v. Trinity Joint Venture, 431 A.2d 1364, 1369 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1981) (finding that partner's action of buying adjacent property without notifying
partnership of opportunity was breach of fiduciary duty).
44. See Hicks, supra note 24, at 434-35.
45. Compare Warthan v. Midwest Consol. Ins. Agencies, Inc., 450 N.W.2d 145,
148 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (indicating the business judgment rule applies to "part-
ners" in a closely held corporation); Black v. NuAIRE, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 209-10
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing applicability of business judgment rule to closely
held corporation's decision to not pursue shareholder's derivative action) with PJ Ac-
quisition Corp. v. Skoglund, 453 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Minn. 1990) (explaining, in a dissent-
ing opinion, recent changes in Minnesota corporation statutes to evidence a
legislative intent that traditional principles of corporate law do not adequately pro-
tect minority interests in closely held corporations); Fewell v. Tappan, 223 Minn.
483, 27 N.W.2d 648, 654 (Minn. 1947) (recognizing the higher duty of good faith
and fairness which exists between partners of a closely held corporation); Harris v.
Mardan Business Sys., Inc., 421 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing
appropriateness of reliance on partnership principles when applying the duty to
members of a closely held corporation); Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775, 779 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1984) (holding "partners" in a closely held corporation to a standard of
highest integrity in their dealings with each other).
46. See PJ Acquisition Corp., 453 N.W.2d at 14 (adopting form of business judg-
ment rule as standard of conduct); Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 288 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990) (recognizing from Evans v. Blesi that shareholders owe fiduciary duty but
adopting only a portion of Evans' language).
47. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(1) (1992). Subdivision 1 of this statute notes that in
regard to the standard of conduct the following must occur:
A director shall discharge the duties of the position of director in good faith,
in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation, and with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like posi-
tion would exercise under similar circumstances. A person who so performs
those duties is not liable by reason of being or having been a director of the
corporation.
Id. Furthermore, this standard is mirrored in another provision addressing the judi-
cial remedies available for consideration in resolving disputes in closely held corpo-
rations. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(3)(a) (1992). When considering whether to grant
relief to closely held corporation shareholders, the statute provides:
In determining whether to order equitable relief, dissolution, or a buy-out,
the court shall take into consideration the duty which all shareholders in a
closely held corporation owe one another to act in an honest, fair, and rea-
sonable manner in the operation of the corporation and the reasonable ex-
pectations of the shareholders as they exist at the inception and develop
during the course of the shareholders' relationship with the corporation and
with each other.
Id.
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the Minnesota Supreme Court nevertheless set forth a less stringent
formulation of the rule for assessing the actions of a closely held cor-
poration in PJ Acquisition Corp. v. Skoglund.49
However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has also recently fol-
lowed a stricter rule in Pedro v. Pedro.50 In Pedro, the court of appeals
held that the members of a closely held corporation have a fiduciary
duty to one another.51 The court cited an earlier Minnesota case,
Evans v. Blesi, 52 for the proposition that the duty "includes [among
other requirements] dealing 'openly, honestly and fairly with other
shareholders.' "53
Nevertheless, this rule does not rise to the strict partnership stan-
dard adopted in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. ,54 which requires the
"utmost good faith and loyalty."55 Such a strict fiduciary duty re-
quires that stockholders conduct their affairs without "avarice, expe-
diency or self-interest in derogation of their duty of loyalty to the
other stockholders and to the corporation."56 The distinction is a
significant, albeit fine, one because the Donahue standard requires
more affirmative proof by the acting party as to the validity of the
transaction in question by not providing for a lesser reasonableness
showing as is present in P.J. Acquisition.57
2. The Burden of Proof
Another issue inherent in fiduciary duty disputes is which party has
the burden of proof. One line of reasoning, articulated in Pepper v.
Litton,58 dictates that a shareholder charged with a breach of fiduci-
ary duty has the burden of proving that the actions leading to the
alleged breach were made in good faith and that the actions were fair
to the corporation.59 Instead of deferring to the defendant share-
49. 453 N.W.2d 1, 19 (Minn. 1990) (stating the shareholders "owe a duty to-
wards one another to act in good faith in an honest, fair and reasonable manner with
the best interests of the corporation in mind") (emphasis added).
50. 489 N.W.2d 798, 801 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
51. Id.
52. 345 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
53. Id. at 779 (citing Fewell v. Tappan, 27 N.W.2d 648, 654 (Minn. 1947)).
54. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). See also Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,
546 (N.Y. 1928).
55. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
56. Id.
57. PJ Acquisition Corp. v. Skoglund, 453 N.W.2d 1, 19 (Minn. 1990).
58. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
59. Id. at 306-07; see also Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 177 (2d Cir. 1955);
Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1976); Donaldson v. Universal Eng'g,
606 So. 2d 980, 987 (La. Ct. App. 1992); Westgor v. Grimm, 318 N.W.2d 56, 59
(Minn. 1982); Poe v. Hutchins, 737 S.W.2d 574, 584 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Lynch v.
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holder's actions that appear to be in good faith, if the plaintiff is able
to show that the defendant had a personal interest in the action, the
court will impose an affirmative burden on the defendant to establish
that such conduct was not wrongful as against the corporation.
60
This burden of proof requirement has been viewed as an excep-
tion to the business judgment rule that courts generally use to ex-
amine the actions of corporate officers.61 However, placing the
initial burden of proof on the defendant shareholder better protects
the interests of minority shareholders in closely held corporations.
Other jurisdictions do not place such a heavy burden of proof on
the defendant shareholder. For instance, in Wilkes v. Springside Nurs-
ing Home, Inc. ,62 the shareholder was only required to establish a le-
gitimate business purpose. 63  This rule merely requires the
shareholder to legitimize the questioned actions. The rule does not
require an initial showing of less harmful alternatives or a showing
that the actions were in good faith and not wrongful as against the
corporation.64 Minnesota has adopted this standard in fiduciary dis-
putes occurring in closely held corporations. 65
Finally, some jurisdictions place the burden of proof on the plain-
tiff, usually a complaining partner. 66 This standard mirrors the leni-
ency of the business judgment rule and is even more favorable to the
alleged wrongdoer. If the plaintiff satisfies the burden by demon-
strating a breach of good faith, the burden shifts to the defendant to
prove the legitimacy of the action in question.67 Minnesota employs
this standard in partnership disputes. 68
60. Pepper, 308 U.S. at 306-07.
61. See Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980).
62. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
63. Id. at 663.
64. Id. The court explained: "[tihe majority [shareholders], concededly, have
certain rights to do what has been termed 'selfish ownership' in the corporation
which should be balanced against the concept of their fiduciary obligation to the mi-
nority." Id. However, under the Wilkes standard when this legitimate business pur-
pose is shown the plaintiff then has the opportunity to demonstrate that the same
objective may have been reached by way of an alternative action that was less harmful
to the plaintiffs interest. Id. If this less harmful alternative is established, the court
must weigh the professed legitimate business purpose against the proposed less
harmful alternative to determine whether or not there has been a fiduciary duty
breach. Id.
65. See PJ Acquisition Corp. v. Skoglund, 453 N.W.2d 1, 18 (Minn. 1990); see also
Harris v. Mardan Business Sys., Inc., 421 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
66. See, e.g., Margeson v. Margeson, 376 N.W.2d 269, 272 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
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3. Tort Theory Versus Contract Theory
Another issue is whether fiduciary principles should be viewed in
the context of tort law or contract law. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts, for example, considers a fiduciary relationship and subse-
quent breach thereof to be grounds for tort liability.69 This distinc-
tion relates to damage awards. Generally, contract law does not
provide a basis from which to award punitive or exemplary dam-
ages, 70 whereas tort law does.7'
Some courts consider a breach of fiduciary duty to be fraud be-
cause a partner or shareholder who fails to disclose material informa-
tion relating to business affairs has made a material
misrepresentation. 72 A material misrepresentation is the corner-
stone of a fraud charge 73 and similarly the duty to disclose material
information is a cornerstone of the fiduciary duty. Concluding that
damages for a breach of fiduciary duty lie in tort is consistent with
the underlying similarity of the duty and fraud.
However, some courts view a breach of fiduciary duty to be
grounded in contract law. 74 This view is based upon the concept of
an implied duty of good faith inherent in a contract. 7 5 Wrongful
conduct is not only a breach of the contract but also a breach of that
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1977). "One standing in a fiduciary
relation with another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a
breach of duty imposed by the relation." Id.
70. See Frank J. Cavico, Jr., Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract-A Principled Ap-
proach, 22 ST. MARY'S LJ. 357, 375-76 (1990) (discussing historical aspects of con-
tract breach and damage remedies); see also Mark Pennington, Punitive Damages for
Breach of Contract: A Core Sample from the Decisions of the Last Ten Years, 42 ARK. L. REV.
31, 46-62 (1989) (discussing recent developments in contract breach cases and evolv-
ing damage remedies which include remedies for a breach of the implied contract
covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
71. See Leslie E. John, Comment, Formulating Standards for Awards of Punitive Dam-
ages in the Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 CAL. L. REV. 2033, 2033-34 (1986) (analyz-
ing tort punitive damages and recent efforts to extend punitive awards to actions
lying both in tort and contract).
72. See Allie v. lonata, 466 So. 2d 1108, 1110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (citing
Douglas v. Ogle, 85 So. 243 (Fla. 1920)); Nevada State Bank v. Jamison Family Part-
nership, 801 P.2d 1377, 1382 (Nev. 1990) (stating breach of fiduciary duty is fraud);
J.F. Schulte v. Apache Corp., 814 P.2d 469, 471 (Okla. 1991) (arguing breach of duty
constitutes constructive fraud); Renberg v. Zarrow, 667 P.2d 465, 472 (Okla. 1983)
(holding no breach of fiduciary duty in this instance but equating breach with fraud).
73. "Elements of a cause of action for 'fraud' include false representation of a
present or past fact made by defendant, action in reliance thereupon by plaintiff, and
damage resulting to plaintiff from such misrepresentation." BLACK'S LAw DICTION-
ARY 660 (6th ed. 1990).
74. See, e.g., Bibo v.Jeffrey's Restaurant, 770 P.2d 290, 295 (Alaska 1989) (recog-
nizing fiduciary duty as grounded in contract); Lee Houston & Assocs., Ltd. v. Ra-
cine, 806 P.2d 848, 853 (Alaska 1991) (following Bibo v. Jeffrey's Restaurant, 770
P.2d 290 (Alaska 1989)).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979). "Every contract im-
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party's fiduciary duty to the other parties to the contract. 76
Courts have applied the contract theory when an apparently ac-
tionable tort claim is barred by the statute of limitations.77 The
courts have not expressly identified all possible fiduciary relation-
ships and consequently an inherent duty of good faith is imposed on
the contractual relationship to protect an apparently wronged indi-
vidual's right to bring a claim.78 The disadvantage of this approach
is that contract law does not generally support punitive damages79
and courts have advanced legitimate policy reasons for imposing pu-
nitive damages if warranted.80
Furthermore, the concern for the apparent lack of duty is mis-
placed. This is because the concept of a fiduciary relationship is one
that can be applied to protect an individual when the circumstances
require such application. 81 If the court is willing to adopt the long-
standing definition of a fiduciary relationship as put forth in Daniel v.
Tolon,82 then the court can find the existence of a fiduciary relation-
poses upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement." Id.
76. Hughes v. Reed, 46 F.2d 435, 441 (10th Cir. 1931).
77. Bibo, 770 P.2d at 295; see also Hughes, 46 F.2d at 440-41 (discussing that an
action against directors is an action upon liability of the statute pertaining to implied
contract and is not barred by the statute of limitations governing actions for injury to
the rights of others); Wallace v. Lincoln Sav. Bank, 15 S.W. 448, 453 (Tenn. 1891)
(finding a breach of fiduciary duty is actionable when claim is barred by tort statute of
limitations).
78. Bibo, 770 P.2d at 295. Some courts approach this issue on the grounds that a
corporate director has an inherent duty of good faith to the shareholders while at the
same time holding the director' liability to the corporation to be expressly in con-
tract. Therefore, a breach of fiduciary duty is a contract based claim. See Boyd v.
Schneider, 131 F. 223, 227 (7th Cir. 1904) (finding an action against bank directors is
an action on contract); Cooper v. Hill, 94 F. 582, 588 (8th Cir. 1899) (discussing that
a fiduciary breach is maintainable either at law or in equity); Hughes, 46 F.2d at 440-
41 (citing Curtis v. Phelps, 208 F. 577 (N.D. N.Y. 1913)).
79. See supra note 70.
80. See, e.g., George v. Bolen, 580 P.2d 1357 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978). The court
stated:
Such damages are allowed not because of any special merit in the injured
party's case, but are imposed by way of punishing the wrongdoer for mali-
cious, vindictive or a willful and wanton invasion of the injured party's
rights, the purpose being to restrain and deter others from the commission
of like wrongs.
Id. at 1364 (citations omitted).
81. See First Sec. Bank of Utah N.A. v. Banberry Dev. Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1332
(Utah 1990). The court articulated:
Whether or not a confidential or fiduciary relationship exists depends on the
facts and circumstances of each individual case. Courts have generally re-
frained from definitively listing the instances of fiduciary relationships in
such a way as to risk excluding the penumbra of unknown or unraised rele-
vant cases.
Id. (quoting Curtis v. Freden, 585 P.2d 993, 998 (Kan. 1978)) (footnotes omitted).
82. 157 P. 756 (Okla. 1916). The court defined a fiduciary as:
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ship whenever the circumstances require such a finding. This allows
the action to be based in tort, without the need to invoke the implied
good faith contract rule.8 3
4. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are an issue when the breach of duty is
grounded in tort law. Despite widespread recognition as a tort ac-
tion, courts may be unwilling to impose punitive damages for a
breach of fiduciary duty in all instances.84 Rather, courts will seek to
compensate the injured party based on the actual harm.
For instance, in a closely held corporation, the injury is often the
majority shareholder's failure to provide a minority shareholder with
an equal opportunity to sell shares.85 When this occurs, courts typi-
cally require the majority to provide the minority shareholder with
the same opportunity.86
The broad principle on which the court acts in cases of this description is
that wherever there exists such a confidence, of whatever character that con-
fidence may be, as enables the person in which confidence or trust is re-
posed to exert influence over the person trusting him, the court will not
allow any transaction between the parties to stand, unless there has been the
fullest and fairest explanation and communication of every particular resting
in the breast of the one who seeks to establish a contract with the person so
trusting him.
Id. at 758. Another court has recognized that "a confidential relationship may arise
not only from the technical fiduciary relationships such as the attorney-client ... but
may arise informally from 'moral, social, domestic, or personal' relationships."
Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962).
83. The author recognizes that there may be significant differences in the statute
of limitations for an action based in tort as opposed to one based in contract. While
the implied good faith argument addresses such an issue, the author believes that as a
policy consideration statutes of limitation are appropriate in these circumstances. A
person who loses the right to a claim by reason of inaction in the face of oppressive
conduct must be held accountable for such inaction.
84. See, e.g., Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 288 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). The
awarding of damages turned on the threshold question of whether or not there was a
difference between the fair value of stock in the company and the amount received in
the buyout. If the fair value was greater, then the measure of damages was this differ-
ence. Id. See also Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1560 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (find-
ing the buy-out offer amount adequately compensated plaintiff for majority's breach
of fiduciary duty).
85. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 508-11 (Mass.
1975). In Donahue, the controlling stockholders authorized the closely held corpora-
tion's purchase of their shares, while failing to allow the minority stockholder the
same opportunity. Id. This constituted a breach of fiduciary duty because the minor-
ity stockholder was effectively compelled to relinquish stock at inadequate prices. Id.
at 515; see also Tillis v. United Parts, Inc., 395 So. 2d 618, 618-19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981); Sundberg v. Abbott, 423 N.W.2d 686, 687 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Schu-
macher v. Schumacher, 469 N.W.2d 793, 798 (N.D. 1991); Crosby v. Beam, 548
N.E.2d 217, 220-21 (Ohio 1989).
86. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 518; see also Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 221
(Ohio 1989), in which the court explained:
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Likewise, in a partnership, a partner may take advantage of an op-
portunity for personal gain at the expense of the partnership.87 This
constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty,88 and this breach is remedied
by means of a judicial accounting that requires the acting partner to
return any profits that were unfairly gained at the expense of the
partnership.89 This remedy ensures that the partner does not con-
vert partnership assets or opportunities for personal advantage to
the disadvantage of the partnership.90
Despite the compensatory remedies available, courts have im-
posed punitive damages under appropriate circumstances9l and
The obligation of the majority or of the dominant group of shareholders
acting for, or through, the corporation is fiduciary in nature. A court of
equity will grant appropriate relief where the majority or dominant group of
shareholders act in their own interest or in the interest of others so as to
oppress the minority or commit fraud upon their rights.
Majority or controlling shareholders breach such fiduciary duty to mi-
nority shareholders when control of the close corporation is utilized to pre-
vent the minority from having an equal opportunity in the corporation.
Control of the stock in a close corporation cannot be used to give the major-
ity benefits which are not shared by the minority.
Id. (citations omitted). But see Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 498 A.2d 642, 651
(Md. 1985) (refusing to follow the Donahue equal opportunity rule).
87. See, e.g., Kazanjian v. Rancho Estates, Ltd., 1 Cal. Rptr.2d 534, 536 (Ct. App.
1991); Williams v. Tritt, 415 S.E.2d 285, 286 (Ga. 1992) (involving partner who de-
rived benefits from partnership without other partner's consent); Weaver v. Millard,
819 P.2d 110, 119 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991) (alleging that partnership profits had been
retained and not accounted for).
88. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 21(1) (1914) (requiring partner to account as a
fiduciary).
89. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Ac-r § 22 (1914). Section 22 of the Uniform Partner-
ship Act provides:
Right to Account. Any partner shall have the right to a formal account as to
partnership affairs:
(a) If he is wrongfully excluded from the partnership business or pos-
session of its property by his co-partners,
(b) If the right exists under the terms of any agreement,
(c) As provided by section 21,
(d) Whenever other circumstances render it just and reasonable.
Id. See also Beckman v. Farmer, 579 A.2d 618, 649-53 (D.C. 1990) (discussing the
accounting remedy).
90. See Johnson v. Northern Trust Co., 425 N.E.2d 973, 977 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
(imposing judicial remedy to protect from conversion of partnership assets by
trustee); Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1269 (Mass. 1989) (holding that
breaching partner must account for any profits arising out of breach of fiduciary
duty); Fouchek v. Janicek, 225 P.2d 783, 789 (Or. 1950) (recognizing that construc-
tive trust forms when partner breaches fiduciary duty).
91. See, e.g., Beckman v. Farmer, 579 A.2d 618, 652 (D.C. 1990) (holding mali-
cious conduct by partner grounds for punitive damages); Washington Medical Ctr.,
Inc. v. Holle, 573 A.2d 1269, 1271 (D.C. 1990) (providing for punitive award due to
oppressive conduct); W. & W. Equip. Co. v. Mink, 568 N.E.2d 564, 577 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1991) (holding oppressive conduct of majority shareholder sufficient for impos-
ing punitive damages); Bassett v. Bassett, 798 P.2d 160, 165 (N.M. 1990) (imposing
punitive damages for wanton disregard of partner's rights); Wing Leasing, Inc. v. M.
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damage remedies may include attorney fees.92 Punitive damages are
permitted "whenever the elements of fraud, malice, gross negli-
gence, or oppression mingle in the controversy." 9 3 Punitive dam-
ages are intended to compensate the injured party and to deter
others from similar conduct.94 Because oppressive behavior is the
foundation of many fiduciary duty claims, punitive damages are an
appropriate judicial response.
Minnesota courts have been willing to award punitive damages in
response to breaches of fiduciary duty.95 Furthermore, in Pedro v.
Pedro,96 the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld an award of attor-
ney's fees based on a finding that a party acted "arbitrarily, vexa-
tiously or otherwise not in good faith."97 The hallmark of a breach
of fiduciary duty is a finding that a party has not acted in good faith98
and Minnesota courts have judicial discretion to impose further dam-
age awards when such circumstances arise.99
III. THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY STATUTES
The lack of uniformity in judicial application of the aforemen-
tioned issues regarding fiduciary duty is of great significance to LLC
members. Because the LLC is likely to be selected as the business
entity of choice over partnerships and closely held corporations, ju-
dicial interpretation focusing on these entities is a necessary tool in
drafting LLC legislation and interpreting existing statutes. Ideally,
this also allows LLC members to anticipate the standard. Unfortu-
nately, statutes enacted to date have been inconsistent in their re-
sponse to judicial developments in this area.
& B. Aviation, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 671, 677 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (holding punitive
damages imposed upon finding of actual malice).
92. See, e.g., Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 290 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). See also
Wing Leasing, Inc. v. M. & B. Aviation, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 671, 677 (Ohio Ct. App.
1988) (stating attorney fees awardable if actual malice present).
93. George v. Bolen, 580 P.2d 1357, 1364 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978).
94. Id. But see E. Donald Elliot, Symposium: Punitive Damages, Why Punitive Dam-
ages Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1053 (1989) (question-
ing the traditional purpose of punitive damage awards and discussing the recent
evolution in the perceived purpose and effectiveness of punitive damages). See gener-
ally RICHARD L. BLATT ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES, A STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO LAW
AND PRACTICE (1991).
95. See, e.g., Shetka v. Kueppers, Kueppers, Von Feldt & Salmen, 454 N.W.2d
916, 919 (Minn. 1990) (noting that partners committing wrongful acts in the ordinary
course of business are liable for punitive damages); Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775,
781 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (awarding punitive damages due to oppressive behavior).
96. 489 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
97. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(4) (1992)).
98. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass.
1975).
99. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(4) (1992).
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A. The Origins of the LLC
Wyoming enacted the first LLC statute in 1977.100 Promulgated
to create a business entity with the tax benefits of a partnership,
more flexibility than an S corporation, 101 and the limited liability of a
corporation,102 the Wyoming Legislature hoped that the LLC would
motivate investment in the state, thereby boosting the state's
economy. 103
Florida was the only other state to enact an LLC statute prior to
1988.104 As in Wyoming, Florida adopted LLC legislation to en-
courage business investment from within the United States as well as
from Central and South America.105
Contrary to both states' expectations, the business community did
not immediately accept or utilize LLCs.106 All of this changed, how-
ever, in 1988 when the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 88-76.107 This
ruling stated that Wyoming LLCs qualify for partnership tax treat-
ment.108  Soon thereafter, states rapidly developed LLC
legislation. 109
As of January 1994, thirty-seven states have enacted LLC legisla-
tion. 110 Nearly every other state is either considering or has pending
100. WYo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -143 (1977, Rev. 1989 and Supp. 1993).
101. The S corporation is taxed similarly to a partnership but is limited to 25
members. The Wyoming LLC does not limit the number of members. Joseph P.
Fonfara & Corey R. McCool, Comment, The Wyoming Limited Liability Company: A Viable
Alternative to the S Corporation and the Limited Partnership?, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV.
523, 524 (1988). See generally Edward J. Roche, Jr. et al., Limited Liability Companies
Offer Pass-Through Benefits Without S Corp. Restrictions, 74J. TAX'N 248 (1991) (discuss-
ing the tax benefits of an LLC over an S corporation).
102. Fonfara & McCool, supra note 101, at 523-24.
103. Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability Company, 41 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 387, 389 (1990).
104. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401-.514 (West Supp. 1994). This statute, en-
acted in 1982, was modeled upon the Wyoming Limited Liability Act. See Keatinge,
supra note 6, at 383 (discussing the similarities and differences between the Florida
and Wyoming statutes).
105. Richard Johnson, Comment, The Limited Liability Company Act, 11 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 387, 387 (1983).
106. By one count, only 26 LLCs existed in Wyoming by 1986. Fonfara & Mc-
Cool, supra note 101, at 523 n.4. Only two LLCs existed in Florida one year after the
statute was enacted. Johnson, supra note 105, at 388.
107. REV. RUL. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
108. The IRS reached this conclusion after six years of study and after finding that
an LLC has more corporate characteristics than noncorporate characteristics. See id.
109. Carter G. Bishop & Daniel S. Kleinberger, Structuring the Minnesota LLC,
BENCH & B. OF MINN., Nov. 1993, at 23, 23; see also Susan P. Hamill, The Limited
Liability Company: A Possible Choice for Doing Business, 41 FLA. L. REV. 731, 722 (1989)
(discussing the Ruling as an end to the uncertainty of the tax status of a Wyoming
LLC); Jonathan Kalstrom, A New Way of Doing Business, WILLIAM MITCHELL MAC.,
Summer 1992, at 9, 11.
110. See ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1 to -61 (Supp. 1993); ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-
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legislation.'I' As the LLCs' popularity grows in the business com-
munity, the entity will inevitably become the subject of future litiga-
tion. This in turn will lead to courts interpreting LLC statutes and
their fiduciary principles." 12
B. Existing Treatment of Fiduciary Duty in LLC Statutes
The LLC statutes' approach to the issue of fiduciary duty can be
divided into five categories. These categories are (1) express fiduci-
ary duty; (2) implied fiduciary duty by reason of indemnification pro-
vision; (3) implied fiduciary duty by reason of "account for"
provision; (4) implied fiduciary duty by reason ofjudicial dissolution;
and (5) no fiduciary duty by reason of indemnification provision.
1. Express Fiduciary Duty
Some LLC statutes expressly use the term "fiduciary" in discuss-
ing the relationship between members or managers" 13 and the busi-
601 to -857 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-32-101 to -1316 (Michie Supp.
1993); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-101 to -913 (West Supp. 1993); Pub. Act No.
93-267, §§ 1-74 1993 Conn. Acts 730 (Reg. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101
to -1107 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401-514 (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 14-11-100 to -1109 (Michie Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 53-601 to -672 (Supp.
1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/1-1 to /60-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-1-1 to -13-1 (1994); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 490A.100-. 1601 (West
Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to -7651 (Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12:1301-:1369 (West Supp. 1994); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 4A-101 to
-1103 (1993 and Supp. 1993); MICH. CoMp. LAWs ANN. §§ 450.4101-.5200 (West
Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. §§ 322B.01-.960 (1992 and West Supp. 1994)); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 79-6-1 to -39 (Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 347.010-.735 (1993);
MoTr. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-101 to -1307 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2601 to -2645
(1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.011-.571 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304-C:1-:85
(1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:2B-1 to -70 (Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-19-1
to -74 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57C-1-01 to -10-07 (1993); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-01 to -155 (Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2000-
2060 (West Supp. 1994); Ch. 173 §§ 1-109 1993 Or. Laws; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-1
to -75 (1992 and Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-34-1 to -59 (Supp.
1993); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n §§ 1.01-11.07 (West Supp. 1994); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-101 to -157 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1123
(Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-lA-I to -69 (Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 183.0102-.1305 (West Supp. 1994); Wvo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -143 (1989 and
Supp. 1993).
As ofJanuary 1994, Mississippi only recognizes LLCs originating in other states.
See Miss. CODE. ANN §§ 79-6-1 to -39 (Supp. 1993). Mississippi does not allow LLCs
to be formed within the state, and as such, the statute does not address the issue of
fiduciary duty.
111. Bishop & Kleinberger, supra note 109, at 23.
112. See generally Keatinge, supra note 6, at 460.
113. Most LLC statutes have default provisions that vest management of the busi-
ness in either the members or managers subject to specific agreement to the contrary
by the members. See, e.g., KANS. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp. 1993). As well, most
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ness. i t 4 While expressly recognizing the existence of a fiduciary
duty, these statutes require that members make a good faith effort to
conduct business affairs in the best interests of the LLC. These
states base this standard of conduct on the business judgment
rule.'15 For example, Louisiana recognizes that a member or man-
ager has a fiduciary duty to the business and the LLC's other mem-
bers.t16 The Louisiana statute requires a member or manager to
"stand in a fiduciary relationship to the limited liability company and
its members . *..."1 17 This relationship requires the member or
manager to conduct company affairs in good faith and with the dili-
gence, care, skill, and judgment that a prudent person in like circum-
stances would believe to be in the best interest of the company and
the members.' 18
Likewise, Delaware incorporates the term fiduciary in that state's
recognition that a member or manager of an LLC has no liability for
actions resulting from good faith reliance on the provisions of a lim-
ited liability company agreement." 9 In granting the acting party a
limitation of liability, the statute expressly recognizes that such a
member or manager has an existing fiduciary duty to the LLC and
company members.12 0 This provision limits the acting party to lia-
statutes allow managers to also be members. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1312
(West Supp. 1994). Consequently, in many closely held LLCs there will be no practi-
cal distinction between members and managers because of the typical hands-on man-
agement that occurs in a closely held business. Many statutes impliedly recognize
this lack of distinction by imposing the same duties on members and managers. For
purposes of this Comment, no general effort is made to distinguish between mem-
bers and managers and references to both presume that managers are also members.
The scope of this Comment is to address the fiduciary duty as between owners of the
business, whether functioning in the capacity of members or managers.
114. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-
305(4) (Michie Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.707 (West Supp. 1994); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1314(1) (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. § 322B.663(4) (1992);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:78(III) (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-66(b) (West
Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-86(5) (Supp. 1993).
115. See supra note 32.
116. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1314(1) (West Supp. 1994); See also DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 18 -1101(c) (1993).
117. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1314(1) (West Supp. 1994).
118. Id.
119. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (1993).
120. Id. Subsection (c) provides:
To the extent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager has duties
(including fiduciary duties) and liabilities relating thereto to a limited liabil-
ity company or to another member or manager:
(1) Any such member or manager acting under a limited liability company
agreement shall not be liable to the limited liability company or to any such
other member or manager for the member's or manager's good faith reli-
ance on the provisions of the limited liability company agreement; and
(2) The member's or manager's duties and liabilities may be expanded or
restricted by provisions in a limited liability company agreement.
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bility for actions that are not in good faith.
While expressly recognizing the fiduciary duty of LLC members,
Delaware is the only state that allows absolute indemnification for
any breach of fiduciary duty.121 The Delaware LLC Act contains a
provision granting the members express power to release any mem-
ber or manager from any liability for any claims against that member
or manager.' 22 The language of this indemnification provision on its
face permits a member to be released from a violation of that mem-
ber's fiduciary duty.123 The only restriction placed upon the mem-
bers' ability to indemnify for such acts is any precondition contained
in the LLC agreement' 24 that restricts the members' power of
indemnification.
Louisiana appears to follow the Delaware approach. Louisiana per-
mits an LLC to release any member or manager from liability for a
breach of fiduciary duty if such power to release is recognized in the
articles of organization or a written operating agreement. 125 But the
power to release a member or manager from liability in Louisiana is
not as all-encompassing as in Delaware.
Louisiana's statute provides that a release of liability cannot re-
lease a member or manager from liability for receiving a financial
benefit to which the member or manager is not entitled. 126 Holding
a member liable for any wrongfully obtained financial benefit is one
standard contained in the general interpretation of fiduciary duty in
both partnerships and closely held corporations. Therefore, while
Id.
121. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-108 (1993). New Jersey may allow the same re-
sult, but not as a default rule as in Delaware. In New Jersey, fiduciary duties may be
restricted if expressly provided for in an operating agreement. NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 42:2B-66(b) (West Supp. 1994). The ability to eliminate the duty is not automatic,
but rather the members must agree to such a limitation by including such in the
operating agreement. Georgia has a provision similar to Delaware that allows for
indemnification for "any and all claims and demands whatsoever." GA. CODE ANN.
§ 14-11-306 (Michie Supp. 1993). However, Georgia's provision recognizes that
there may not be indemnification for certain duties or acts as expressed in section 14-
11-305(4)(A) (i-ii).
122. Id. This section provides:
Subject to such standards and restrictions, if any, as are set forth in its lim-
ited liability company agreement, a limited liability company may, and shall
have the power to, indemnify and hold harmless any member or manager or other person
from and against any and all claims and demands whatsoever.
Id. (emphasis added).
123. Id.
124. "'Limited liability company agreement' " means a written agreement of the
members as to the affairs of a limited liability company and the conduct of its busi-
ness. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(6) (1993). This agreement is more commonly
known in other LLC statutes as an "operating agreement."
125. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1315(A) (West Supp. 1994).
126. Id. § 12:1315(B).
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appearing to follow Delaware's unique approach of allowing the re-
lease of all fiduciary obligations, the Louisiana provision in fact
maintains some degree of fiduciary duty for members.127
Iowa also incorporates the term "fiduciary" into statutorily author-
ized limitations of an acting manager or member's liability to the
company or other members.128 The Iowa statute authorizes an
LLC's articles of organization to limit or eliminate a member or
manager's personal liability for a breach of fiduciary duty.129 The
initial impression is that the Iowa statute absolves the acting party
from liability for a breach of fiduciary duty, but the exceptions to this
rule belie such an impression.130
The Iowa limitation of liability is actually quite narrow because the
exceptions hold that the articles of organization cannot limit a mem-
ber or manager's liability for a breach of duty of loyalty, an act not in
good faith, or an act that gives that person an improper personal
benefit.13, These exceptions incorporate the generally recognized
fiduciary duty standards. Consequently, the Iowa statute maintains a
broad fiduciary duty for a member or manager to the business or
other members.
2. Implied Fiduciary Duty by Reason of Indemnification Provision
Other states impliedly adopt a fiduciary duty for LLC members or
managers through the LLC statute's indemnification provision.
These statutes do not use the term "fiduciary" and generally impose
a requirement that members or managers conduct business in good
faith and in the best interests of the LLC.i32 This standard of con-
duct is modelled after the business judgment rule,
127. The New Hampshire Act also allows for a release of liability, but, contrary to
Louisiana, New Hampshire provides that the LLC may also release a member from
liability for improper gains. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:31 (V-VI) (1993). In spite
of this broad release language, the New Hampshire act does not allow for the limita-
tion or elimination of a member or manager's liability for acts constituting gross neg-
ligence or willful misconduct. Id. § 304-C:31(V). Although that standard is more
commonly discussed in relation to the duty of care, courts have found a breach of
fiduciary duty based on a showing of bad faith and willful misconduct arising out of
attempted freeze-outs. See, e.g., W & W Equip. Co., Inc. v. Mink, 568 N.E.2d 564, 577
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991). Consequently, one can argue that the New Hampshire statute
does not release a member from all potential liability for breach of fiduciary duty.
128. IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.707 (West Supp. 1994).
129. Id.
130. Id. § 490A.707(I)-(3).
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT, § 7-80-406(l) (Supp. 1993). The Colorado statute
provides:
A manager . . . shall perform his duties as a manager in good faith, in a
manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the limited lia-
bility company, and with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would use under similar circumstances. A person who so performs
1993]
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The fiduciary duty is established by examining the language of
these indemnification provisions to determine for what acts a mem-
ber or manager will be indemnified. From those acts that will not be
indemnified, comes the duty. While the states vary in distinguishing
between acts that will and acts that will not be indemnified, regard-
less of where the line is drawn that line establishes the point at which
the duty may be breached. There are at least seven varieties of in-
demnification provisions.
One variety of indemnification provision is exemplified by Ala-
bama.133 That state's provision allows for indemnification for all acts
except those in which the member or manager is found to be "liable
for negligence or misconduct in the performance of duty .... .1134
Thus, in these states the member may have fiduciary duty liability if
the complaining member can establish the conduct at issue meets
what is a low threshold level of misconduct even if the controlling
standard of conduct is based on the business judgment rule.
Indiana represents another version of the duty arising out of the
indemnification provision.135 Indiana's indemnification provision
authorizes indemnification for all acts except "in the case of action or
failure to act by the member, agent, or employee which constitutes
willful misconduct or recklessness .... "136 This language creates a
higher threshold for establishing the breach because of the intent
element that is not present in the first group of states. While creat-
ing more difficulty for the complaining member, the intent element
should not preclude a finding of a breach of the duty. Courts have
found that oppressive majority conduct constituted malicious intent
for purposes of imposing punitive damages in some cases.13
7
Another group of statutes is exemplified by the Nevada provision
that permits indemnification if the member "acted in good faith and
in a manner which he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to
the best interests of the company."s38 This language adopts the
his duties shall not have any liability by reason of being or having been a
manager of the limited liability company.
Id.
133. ALA. CODE § 10-12-4(n) (Supp. 1993); see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2603(1 1)
(Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-34-25 (Supp. 1993); Wyo. STAT. § 17-
15-104(xi) (Supp. 1993).
134. ALA. CODE § 10-12-4(n) (Supp. 1993).
135. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-2-2(14) (West Supp. 1994); see also MD. CORPS &
Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 4A-203(12) (1993); MoN'. CODE ANN. § 35-8-107(12) (1993);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2003(11) (West Supp. 1994).
136. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-2-2(14) (West Supp. 1994).
137. See supra note 91.
138. NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.411 (1993); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4363(1) (West
Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 15/10(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994). Flor-
ida and Illinois also create the fiduciary duty in another manner that may be more
useful to a complaining member under certain circumstances. See infra part III.B.3.
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business judgment rule and provides great deference to the acting
member's conduct, thus creating a strong barrier to establishing a
breach of the duty in these states.
Yet another variety of indemnification provision is exemplified by
Colorado.' 3 9 This provision allows indemnification for all acts ex-
cept those "[i]n connection with any proceeding charging improper
personal benefit to the manager, whether or not involving action in
his official capacity, in which he was adjudged liable on the basis that
personal benefit was improperly received by him."140 While limiting
the member's exposure to only those acts that provided the im-
proper benefit, gaining an improper personal benefit is a hallmark
act of breaching one's fiduciary duty. Therefore, this exception to
indemnification provides a significant potential tool for a com-
plaining member.
Another group of states provides indemnification on the basis of
the individual state's corporate law indemnification provisions. 14 1
These states provide that the LLC may indemnify certain LLC indi-
viduals to the extent that corporations are permitted to indemnify
similar persons. 142 Consequently, a complaining member in these
states will need to look to the state's corporate law provisions to de-
termine what acts will not get statutory protection.143
One state, Oregon, refers to general partnership standards of con-
duct in determining the line at which indemnification will no longer
result. 144 The statute provides that the LLC may limit, eliminate, or
indemnify a member for monetary damages arising out of that mem-
139. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-410(2)(C)(II) (West Supp. 1993); see also FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 608.4363(7) (West Supp. 1994); MIcH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 450.4407
(West Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-404(2)(a) (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 57C-3-32(b) (1993); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-104(xi) (Supp. 1993).
140. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-410(2)(c)(2)(II) (West Supp. 1993).
141. See KANS. STAT. ANN. § 17-7604(j) (Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-16-4(k)
(1992); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.20 (West Supp. 1994); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-1009(16) (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-4(12) (Supp. 1993).
142. For example, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.20(A) (West Supp.
1994) states:
A limited liability company shall have power to indemnify managers, of-
ficers, employees, agents and others to the same extent a corporation may
indemnify directors, employees, agents and others under the TBCA [Texas
Business Corporations Act] and shall, to the extent indemnification is re-
quired under the TBCA for directors, employees, agents and others, indem-
nify managers, officers, employees, agents and others to the same extent.
Id. See also W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-33 (Supp. 1993).
143. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 31-1-9(a) (1988) (indemnifying corporate actions if
they "were in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not
opposed to the best interest of the corporation."); see also TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art 1396, § 222A (West Supp. 1994) (adopting similar business judgment rule
standard).
144. Ch. 173 1993 Or. Laws § 34.
1993] 1011
23
Curwin: Fiduciary Duty and the Minnesota Limited Liability Company: Suffi
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1993
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
ber or manager's conduct.145 However, the LLC may not release any
member from liability for breach of that member's duty of loyalty to
the LLC or the other members for bad faith acts that involve inten-
tional misconduct or transactions that provide an improper personal
benefit to that member.146 While not expressly stating that fiduciary
duties apply to the Oregon LLC, this statutory language obviously
recognizes the duty.
3. Fiduciary Duty by Reason of "Account for" Provision
A number of states147 incorporate a provision requiring the mem-
ber or manager to essentially "account to the limited liability com-
pany and hold as trustee for it any profit or benefit derived without
the informed consent of the members by the manager from any
transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of
the limited liability company."148
While there are various consent provisions and other safe harbors
available for the acting party,' 49 the language is a general recogni-
tion that members or managers may not always participate in self-
dealing transactions without concern for potential liability.150 These
provisions are another avenue for asserting that a fiduciary duty ex-
ists between members when the facts present a self-dealing or corpo-
rate usurpation circumstance.
4. Implied Fiduciary Duty by Reason of Judicial Dissolution
A few states impliedly establish statutory fiduciary duties between
LLC members by means of a judicial dissolution provision.15' This
provision provides an alternative means for a complaining member
to obtain judicial relief when oppression is present in the business
relationship.
145. Id.
146. Ch. 173 1993 Or. Laws § 34(1)(a-c).
147. See, e.g., Pub. Act 93-267 1993 Conn. Acts 730 § 22(e) (Reg. Sess.); IND.
CODE ANN. § 23-18-4-2(b) (West Supp. 1994); Mich. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 450.4404(5) (West Supp. 1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 347.088(2) (1993); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-8-402(2) (Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-16(D) (Michie Supp.
1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-22(e) (1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2016(5)
(West Supp. 1994); Ch. 173 1993 Or. Laws § 33(5); R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-16-17(e)
(1992); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 183.0402(2) (West Supp. 1994).
148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-22(e) (1993).
149. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-16(D) (Michie Supp. 1993) (listing three
safe harbors for self-dealing transactions).
150. See supra note 17.
151. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.449(2) (West Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-
643(1)-(2) (Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 35/5 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
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These statutes generally provide that upon application by an LLC
member, a court has the power to order a dissolution of the LLC if
that member can show one of two conditions. For example, in Idaho
dissolution may be ordered when there is a showing of deadlocked
management and this deadlock is or may cause irreparable harm to
the LLC.152
Alternatively, if there is a showing that the acts of those in control
of the LLC are "illegal, oppressive or fraudulent and that irrepar-
able injury to the limited liability company is being suffered or
is threatened by reason thereof" then the court may order
dissolution. 153
Illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct is a common factor in
breaches of fiduciary duty occurring in closely held corporations. By
granting a remedy of dissolution, these statutes strongly imply that
such conduct breaches a duty as between members of the LLC and
courts should be willing to impose sanctions on such conduct. These
provisions provide another avenue that LLC members in these states
may pursue to protect their interest in the business.
5. No Fiduciary Duty by Reason of Indemnification Provision
Two states using similar indemnification provisions appear to im-
pliedly bar the application of any type of fiduciary duty. 154 Arizona
and Arkansas have indemnification provisions that expressly provide
that the LLC may indemnify a member or manager for a breach of
any duty, without reserving any actions for which the acting member
or manager cannot be indemnified.
For example, the Arizona provision simply states "that a domestic
limited liability company may . .. [i]ndemnify a member, manager,
employee, officer, or agent or any other person."155 The provision
has no limitations on scope or applicability and apparently grants the
LLC the power to indemnify for any and all acts.
These two states do not appear to recognize the applicability of
any fiduciary duties between the owners of an LLC. The conse-
quence is that in those states minority owners have little, if any, stat-
utory recourse for protecting their business interests.
152. IDAHO CODE § 53-643(1) (Supp. 1993).
153. Id. at § 53-643(2).
154. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-610(13) (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-
32-404 (Michie Supp. 1993). Three other states have similar provisions. See IDAHO
CODE § 53-624 (Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-18 (Michie Supp. 1993); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 183.0106 (West Supp. 1994). However, Idaho and Wisconsin provide
an alternative means of establishing the duty under judicial dissolution provisons. See
supra note 151. The New Mexico statute is not clear regarding the duty, given that
the statute has a separate provision requiring a member to account for certain trans-
actions. See supra note 147.
155. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-610(13) (Supp. 1993).
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IV. THE MINNESOTA LLC ACT AND FIDUCIARY DUTY
The Minnesota LLC Act is similar to the LLC statutes enacted in
Louisiana, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
and North Dakota because of the express use of the term "fiduci-
ary."' 5 6 The Minnesota Act differs, however, by adopting a two-pro-
nged approach to the fiduciary duty issue.
The first prong defines fiduciary principles and sets forth the stan-
dards of conduct for an LLC governor57 and an LLC manager.' 5 8 A
governor must discharge the duties of that position in a manner of
care and good faith with the best interests of the LLC in mind.159
While an LLC may use the articles of organization to limit the gover-
nor's liability,160 the governor, by statute, must maintain a duty of
156. See MINN. STAT. § 332B.663(4) (1992).
157. A "governor" is a natural person serving on the board of governors. MINN.
STAT. § 322B.03(24) (1992). In an accompanying report to the Minnesota Senate
and House, the Limited Liability Company Committee refers to the governors of an
LLC as the counterpart to directors of a corporation. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE BUSINESS LAW, TAX LAW AND REAL PROPERTY SECTIONS OF
THE MINNESOTA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE, at 6
(1992).
MINN. STAT. § 322B.663(1) (1992) states:
A governor shall discharge the duties of the position of governor in
good faith, in a manner the governor reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the limited liability company, and with the care an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circum-
stances. A person who so performs those duties is not liable by reason of
being or having been a governor of the limited liability company.
Id.
158. MINN. STAT. § 322B.69 (1992) states:
A manager shall discharge the duties of an office in good faith, in a
manner the manager reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
limited liability company, and with the care an ordinarily prudent person in
a like position would exercise under similar circumstances. A person exer-
cising the principal functions of an office or to whom some or all of the
duties and powers of an office are delegated pursuant to section 322B.689 is
considered a manager for purposes of this section and sections 322B.38 and
322B.699.
Id.
159. MINN. STAT. § 322B.663(l) (1992).
160. Id § 322B.663(4). The subsection provides in part:
A governor's personal liability to the limited liability company or its mem-
bers for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a governor may
be eliminated or limited in the articles of organization. The articles may not
eliminate or limit the liability of a governor:
(1) for any breach of the governor's duty of loyalty to the limited liabil-
ity company or its members;
(2) for acts or omissions not in good faith or that involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law;
(3) under section 80A.23 or 322B.56;
(4) for any transaction from which the governor derived an improper
personal benefit; or
(5) for any act or omission occurring before the date when the provi-
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loyalty and good faith.161 Under the statute, an LLC cannot absolve
a governor from liability resulting from a breach of the statutory
duty. 162
On the other hand, the Minnesota statute holds managers to the
more lenient standard of good faith and reasonable actions in the
best interests of the business.163 This is the fiduciary duty as defined
by the business judgment rule.
The second prong is remedial in nature. Instead of defining the
applicable standards, this prong sets forth the available remedies for
breach of fiduciary duty claims in a closely held LLC.164 In deter-
mining the appropriate remedy, courts must assess the alleged
breach in light of the duty which exists among members of a closely
held corporation to act in an honest, fair and reasonable manner
while conducting LLC operations.16 5
This two-pronged approach is not common in LLC legislation.
While some states expressly discuss fiduciary duties, there is cur-
rently only one other LLC statute that singles out the closely held
entity for special protection.166 This distinction is significant be-
cause many future users of the LLC entity may likely have otherwise
formed as closely held corporations.
sion in the articles of organization eliminating or limiting liability be-
comes effective.
Id.
161. MINN. STAT. § 322B.663(4)(l)-(2) (1992).
162. Id.
163. MINN. STAT. § 322B.69 (1992). There is no provision for any limitation or
elimination of the manager's duty of conduct under this standard. Id.
164. MINN. STAT. § 322B.833 (1992). The statute provides in relevant part:
In determining whether to order relief under this section and in determin-
ing what particular relief to order, the court shall take into consideration the
duty that all members in a closely held limited liability company owe one
another to act in an honest, fair, and reasonable manner in the operation of
the limited liability company and the reasonable expectations of the mem-
bers as they exist at the inception and develop during the course of the
members' relationship with the limited liability company and with each
other.
Id. § 322B.833(4).
165. See id. This language is adopted from MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, a corporate
law provision specifically for closely held corporations that has been interpreted to
provide the court with broad equitable powers to enforce fiduciary duties among
shareholders in closely held corporations. See Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798, 801-
02 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
166. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-119(3) (Supp. 1993) (adopting identical lan-
guage to Minn. Stat. § 322B.833(4)). The North Dakota statute is not discussed in
this Comment, as the entire act is adopted almost word for word from Minnesota's
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V. A PROPOSAL FOR PROTECTING MINORITY INTERESTS IN LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES
While a number of LLC statutes address the fiduciary duty of LLC
members, an inherent shortcoming remains: few, if any, of the statu-
tory provisions specifically address minority interests. This is be-
cause the vast majority of statutes adopt the business judgment rule,
thereby allowing for potential abuses by the majority. Consequently,
LLC statutes must adopt a more rigorous standard of fiduciary duty
to protect these minority interests.
This Comment proposes a multi-faceted foundation for the adop-
tion of a more rigorous standard. Each LLC statute should contain a
separate provision expressly delineating the fiduciary duty standard
and the consequences for breach of that duty. This standard would
consist of at least four parts: (1) incorporating an expressed fiduciary
duty provision in each statute; (2) adopting the strict fiduciary duty
rule; (3) placing the burden of proof on the defendant to show with
clear and convincing evidence that the challenged action is not
wrongful; and (4) uniformly imposing punitive damages for breach
of the duty.
By employing language stating an expressed fiduciary duty, the
state would signal both the importance of the duty and clarify that
this duty applies to LLCs. Explicit language would also signal to the
courts that a fiduciary duty exists in LLCs. As a result, the courts will
not be required to determine this threshold issue. This streamlining
procedure will promote efficient use of judicial resources.
The proposal's second facet suggests that the express fiduciary
provision adopt the strict fiduciary duty rule as applied in Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co. 16 7 States adopting this rule would protect the in-
terests of noncontrolling members of the LLC. Because of the lim-
ited transferability of an LLC interest, 16 8 LLC members are
restricted in responding to oppressive conduct. A strict fiduciary
rule is more likely to provide protection against such conduct.
Furthermore, incorporation of this rule would help deter oppres-
sive conduct. Not only would an oppressed member be able to turn
to the courts for relief, but the oppressor would be put on notice that
any actions would be held to the strictest scrutiny. This strict scru-
tiny exceeds the degree of scrutiny involved in the business judg-
ment rule currently incorporated in the LLC statutes.
167. 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975). See supra part II.B. I for a discussion of the
strict fiduciary duty rule.
168. An LLC interest is inherently limited in its transferability because of the stat-
utory restrictions and requirements placed upon its transfer. For example, in Minne-
sota, an LLC member may only transfer an entire LLC interest upon written consent
of all other LLC members. See MINN. STAT. §§ 322B.31, 322B.313 (1992).
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While recognizing the concern the Wilkes court expressed for im-
posing the strict duty upon all closely held corporations, the benefits
will outweigh the potential harms. The goal is to deter controlling
members from acting in an oppressive manner. By imposing a strict
duty, members will have to seriously consider their actions at the
outset to refrain from conducting oppressive activities if they wish to
avoid fiduciary duty liability.
The proposed standard's third element places the burden of proof
on the challenged member. That member must show that the chal-
lenged actions were undertaken with good faith and that the member
was not motivated by self-interest. To be effective, the statutory pro-
vision must incorporate this burden. In addition to guiding LLC
members, this element will provide the courts with another tool to
remedy oppressive conduct.
The final element provides for uniform application of punitive
damages where the court finds a breach of the duty. Punitive dam-
age awards are intended to deter others from acting in a particular
manner in the future.169 The LLC is an entity gaining increasing
acceptance throughout the country and is likely to be increasingly
used as an economic vehicle in the future. Consequently, allowing
the courts to impose punitive damages for breaches of the duty will
serve to check abuse by controlling members that may, if unchecked,
deter widespread acceptance of the entity.
VI. CONCLUSION
While a number of LLC statutes have addressed the issue of fiduci-
ary duty, these statutes have not done so in a uniform manner. This
lack of uniformity can lead to confusion and mistakes by individuals
and courts. The application of a fiduciary duty is of utmost impor-
tance in protecting an individual's interest in a business entity. The
lack of any statutory uniformity to date is a significant shortcoming in
the development of the LLC entity.
Obviously, the adoption of this proposed statutory standard does
not provide the ultimate solution. In spite of the guidance that such
an expressed provision provides, the judiciary will still be required to
apply this duty on a fact specific basis. Such an application is inher-
ent in the concept of fiduciary duty.
The purpose of this proposal is not to set forth a rigid standard
against which all future disputes are then to be analyzed. On the
contrary, the purpose of this proposed standard is to provide distinct
guideposts and to build a foundation against which a court may com-
mence analysis. By expressly adopting a strict rule whose compo-
nents include a heavy burden of proof on the defendant, a high
169. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
19931 1017
29
Curwin: Fiduciary Duty and the Minnesota Limited Liability Company: Suffi
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1993
1018 WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 19
standard of conduct required of the challenged party, and the ability
to impose punitive damages, the statutes will leave little doubt that
the LLC will hold members to a standard of conduct intended to
protect a party's interest and to promote the effective adaptation of
this entity to the business environment.
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